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Essays
Justice Across the Generations
Richard A. Epstein*
The recent revival in ethical theory has led philosophers, political
theorists, and even lawyers to think hard about justice across the generations.' The conceptual problems that lie in the path of this venture are
difficult. As commonly phrased, the issue is often what duties do people
alive today owe to unborn future persons? The normal modes of inquiry
are effectively barred in dealing with this question. Democratic
processes with universal sufferage cannot register the preferences of the
unborn, and dialogue between generations is frustrated when future generations, or at least some future generations, are of necessity silent. The
usual sources of information being closed, the analysis often proceeds by
examining hypothetical situations, most of which ask a deceptively simple question: What would we want the present generation to do if we
stood in the shoes of some future unborn generation?
For some, like John Rawls, the answer seems relatively straightforward: "Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that they have established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable
amount of real capital accumulation."' 2 Rawls emphasizes collective determination, undertaken from behind a veil of ignorance, as to the optimal savings rate within each generation for the benefit of those that
follow it. As stated, the principle anticipates a persistent increase of the
savings rate with wealth until some kind of 'steady state' is achieved, for
"when just institutions are firmly established, the net accumulation required falls to zero."' 3 The entire scheme essentially insists that the tem* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
This paper was prepared for a Conference on Intergenerational Justice held at the University of
Texas in October 1988. I wish to thank Henry Hansman for his valuable comments on an earlier
draft of this article. Ellyn Acker and James Fiero provided able research assistance.
1. See, eg., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 107-221 (1980) (chapter
entitled "Justice Over Time"); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971) (chapter entitled
"The Problem of Justice Between Generations").
2. J. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 285.
3. Id. at 287. The "steady state" seems to be remarkably static in that increased levels of
productivity might call for a positive savings and investment rate.
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poral priority of people alive in the present yields them no moral priority.
The same sentiments are expressed by Bruce Ackerman, who has argued
that "all citizens are at least as good as 6ne another regardless of their
date of birth."'4 Again, the clear implication is that some form of moral
and, more importantly, legal constraint is necessary to protect the legitimate claims of future generations.
I confess that my moral intuitions on the grand scheme of things are
not as well developed as either Rawls or Ackerman. Hard as I try, I
cannot determine precisely what it was that my parents owed me, or
what their generation owed my generation, or those yet to come. I am
also somewhat overwhelmed by a similar inability to express what I owe
my children, as opposed to what I hope to provide them with, or to determine, even globally, what my generation owes the next generation. I
shall therefore attend to a more modest task. I propose to worry less
about moral duties and more about real prospects. My thesis is that the
debate on equity between the generations focuses too much on duty and
too little on practice and incentive. Coercion and duty can do little specifically to insure that the next generation receives its "fair share" of
human and natural resources. If we continue along in an unreflective
state to create sound institutions for the present, the problem of future
generations will pretty much take care of itself,5 even if we do not develop some overarching policies of taxation or investment that target future generations for special consideration.
This answer may be thought of as selfish and as incompatible with
any disinterested inquiry from behind the veil of ignorance or in the full
light of day. Nonetheless we ought to adopt this "leave bad enough
alone" attitude because the alternatives are worse. The issue is not that
of intentions, or of obligations, but of the connection between means and
ends. A classical liberal regime of limited government, low taxation, personal liberty, and private property benefits future generations more than
an alternative regime that consciously enlists large government to restrain liberty and to limit the present use of property for the benefit of
future generations. The use of collective coercion must be carefully husbanded lest it does more harm than good.
To develop this thesis, I will approach the problem of intergenerational equity in stages. First, I ask how the problem of intertemporal
allocation works in the absence of conflict between generations, so that
the only problems are those of self-knowledge and coordinating present
4. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 203.
5. See Williams, Running Out: The Problem ofExhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165,
182 (1978) ("Let future generations take their luck as past ones did.").
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and future preferences. In this context, I conclude that although
problems of foresight and planning exist, there is nothing that any system
of public regulation can do to counteract them. Whatever the philosophical conundrums associated with self-knowledge and personal identity,
the correct and workable assumptions must hold fast in the end to the
naive view that preferences are generally continuous, stable, and well
ordered.
Second, I shall examine the conflict between the generations within
the context of the family, an institution in which the utility of the parents
depends in part on the welfare of their children. Here I argue that the
natural parental investment in their children creates a bias for the protection of their future that legal and social institutions should exploit, not
undermine. Taxing and regulatory policies designed to secure equality of
wealth in the next generation do so at the cost of reducing the levels of
capital accumulation, thus putting the claims of intragenerational equity
(if compelling at all) at odds with those of intergenerational equity.
Third, I shall then expand the inquiry to consider systems of public
ownership that might be used to accumulate and invest present resources
for future use. In this context, I believe that the efforts tend again to be
self-defeating if only because it is harder to make public institutions responsive to the future than private ones given the short-term political
pressures under which public institutions operate. What is true with respect to public assets is also true of public liabilities. The increase in
public debt incurred to fuel public expenditures marks a covert transfer
from future to present generations. A system of common-law property
rights will tend to give greater protection to future generations than any
regulatory or taxing substitute. Governmental regulation most properly
concerns activities causing environmental spillovers and externalitiesactivities generating problems for which property rights solutions are
weakest, both within and across generations.
I.

The Self and the Future

The problem of equity between the generations presupposes that we
can identify a conflict of interest between what people want today and
what unborn people will want on some distant tomorrow. If one were to
indulge for the moment in the assumption of a pie of constant size, then
the argument is that each generation is entitled to only one slice of that
pie, so that it is greed (or worse, theft)6 if members of the present genera6. See, eg., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 203 ("So far as ideal theory is concerned, the bad
trustee stands no better than any other kind of thief.").
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tion even nibble on a slice that in principle belongs to some future generation. 7 To understand how serious a risk this overconsumption might
prove to be in practice, imagine a different kind of universe where the
question of temporal preferences remains but where any conflict of interest between generations disappears. That world exists when there is a
single person who has all present and future claims on a limited set of
resources. No group of individuals living in succession over the same
period of time could hope to do a better job allocating those resources
than this single person.
But how long does that person live? If that person were immortal,
then the question of asset use and conservation quite literally blows up
before our eyes. It is quite impossible to have equal endowments of a
finite asset that will last an infinite period of time. If any minimum level
of asset consumption is required for each period, it cannot be satisfied for
all periods simultaneously. The only distributions of finite assets that
can last an infinite time are those that follow some exponential decay
function. This situation rules out equal consumption over all relevant
periods.8
The assumption of immortality also makes it impossible to plan actions or evaluate behavior, because no one ever has to pay the full consequences of an error in judgment or conduct. Immortal people do not
face the risks of starvation, death in combat, or even old age. By hypothesis, they have triumphed over scarcity, the basic fact on which all economic theories of allocation and all legal theories of entitlement 9 depend.
No one quite knows what he could or could not do if he were immortal.
What is true of single individuals is true of societies at large; again, the
assumption of immortality is necessarily incompatible with a universe of
7. Here I put aside the problem of an infinite number of future generations, so that no one
generation could have a finite part of any pie, no matter how large. In the short run, this difficulty
could be overcome by assuming an expanding output via improved production. But, in the long run,
if resources are finite, then extinction is the necessary fate of all living species, including man, so that
equality between the generations could never be maintained.
8. See Williams, supra note 5, at 169-73. Williams demonstrates that the resource owner will
diminish the consumption in each period by the real interest rate, which in turn reflects the price of
deferred gratifications. The formula he derives is x=S (1-a) where S equals the amount of the
original stock, a equals the fractional use that each period represents of the prior period, and x
equals that portion of the stock consumed in the period. In order for the consumption to be equal in
all periods, a has to be set equal to I, which means that x, the amount consumed in the first period is
zero. Ifx is a market basket of all goods and services, then there will be no second period. If there is
some threshold x* below which an individual or group cannot sustain itself, then human survival
and equal consumption over all periods are not mutually compatible.
9. In legal theories of entitlement for each right there is a correlative duty. See, e.g., W.
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 38 (1919) (stating that "it is certain that even
those who use the word and the conception 'right' in the broadest possible way are accustomed to
thinking of 'duty' as the invariable correlative").

1468
HeinOnline -- 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1468 1988-1989

Justice Across the Generations
finite resources. We have to stick to people with finite lives to understand how choices are made over time.10
Once we assume the existence of some fixed life, even one with an
uncertain duration, the problem of resource allocation over time becomes
tractable. The ordinary individual will have to decide the allocation between present and future consumption, and present and future labor,
given his preferences (which may change) for both labor and consumption, subject to a scarcity constraint. The resources used today will not
be available in future periods: those who work hard today must recuperate tomorrow. By the same token, the consumption enjoyed today cannot be had tomorrow. An individual of this type would face the problem
of discounting future costs and benefits to their present value." This
discounting tendency suggests that it is better to advance consumption
and to defer labor, but there is a countervailing tendency. The person's
probable belief that there are diminishing returns to consumption in any
given period will lead to some desire to equalize net consumption over
different periods of time. There is thus some pressure to defer net consumption. Exactly how these two pressures balance out is hard to predict in the abstract.
One implicit assumption in this model is that individuals retain constant preferences over time, or more generally, that they will be the
"same people" tomorrow that they are today. This proposition is not
necessarily accurate. People may have preferences that change all the
time, and in principle the changes could be large enough to constitute a
radical change in personal identity. But denying the continuity of preferences and of persons has certain dramatic consequences for the way in
which people undertake the ordinary business of life, even within the
same generation, or on the same day. Taken to its extreme, the position
could be that persons are reconstituted on a continuous basis.12 The person who orders the ham sandwich at lunch is not the same person to
whom it is served ten minutes later, who in turn is not the same person
who pays for it ten minutes after that. (This is a fast food restaurant.) 13
10. See Williams, supra note 5, at 169-73. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE
CONSUMPTION FUNcTION passim (1957); Hall, Stochastic Implicationsofthe Life Cycle-Permanent
Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. 971, 974-75 (1978) (analyzing theoretical formula used to represent a model of life cycle consumption).
11. See Williams, supra note 5, at 170 (noting that a human preference exists for discounting
the future to present value).
12. See generally D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 302-06 (1984) (discussing the concept of
"successive selves").
13. John Donne, both lawyer and poet, made the same point far more elegantly in Woman's
Constancy:
Now thou hast lov'd me one whole day,
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People could be regarded as constant entities only over the smallest slivers of time, so that every case necessarily involves a temporal externality:
the person who buys the sandwich at noon is allowed to bind the "different" person called upon to eat it at 12:10 p.m., and so on throughout the
days, weeks, months, and years.
Thinking of this sort, however, is both ruinous and wrong. It is
ruinous because it undermines the possibility of any social order. No set
of long-term arrangements-no contracts, marriages, or friendshipscould exist if individual personality was as plastic as this model of personal identity might suggest. Similarly, governmental regulation would
be impossible, for no regulator could govern if his own preference structure and personal identity were as unstable as those of the public at large.
No set of institutions can make sense if human preferences are radically
discontinuous over time. 14 For governmental regulation to be possible,
the internal transformations within the person must be ignored, even if
personal identity is as unstable as this extreme illustration suggests. The
ordinary presumptions have to be established the other way, and some
special proof of mental disorder (such as addiction to mind-bending
drugs) must be necessary to overcome them.
Fortunately, however, we are not forced to choose between necessary social convention and philosophical truth. The entire system of biological inheritance depends on the ability of organisms to produce
themselves over a life cycle. If organisms had preferences as transient
and erratic as the above example suggests, they could never have raised
their children to maturity; the entire cycle of evolution would have
ground to a halt long before any persons could write about it. There are
enormous selection pressures toward stability in human personality because of the survival advantages that it confers. Organisms that know
their payoff schedules when they start to act get higher returns than
those organisms that do not. Over time, the former will survive and the
latter will perish. The total correspondence between physical organism
and psychological continuity makes it far easier to organize any form of
human personality.
Tomorrow when you leav'st, what wilt thou say?
Wilt thou then Antedate some new made vow?
Or say that now
We are not just those persons, which we were?
Or, that oathes made in reverentiall fear
Of Love, and his wrath, any may foreswear?
J. DONNE, THE POEMS OF JOHN DONNE 9 (H. Grierson ed. 1912).
14. See North, Institutions,Transaction Costs, and Economic Growth, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 419,
421 (1987) (explaining that the complexity of stable institutions is limited by the stability of norms of
behavior and common ideologies of the relevant population).
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In this context, it is important to distinguish between two forms of
adaptation. On the one hand, it is clear that a person, to survive and
prosper, must be able to take into account changes in the external environment, and new information about the various courses of action that
might be undertaken. The ability to respond reliably to what is good and
bad in the external world is a key element of success for all individuals.
That limited task of adaptation is quite formidable in its own right. New
experiences constantly confront individuals with uncertain data that
must be integrated into an already existing knowledge base. Just as individuals may not incorporate the new knowledge quickly enough, so to
they may give it excessive weight.1 5 If the individual's set of basic preferences is constantly changing at the same time as he is responding to the
new information then all these difficulties of responding are more complex. Adapting to the external world becomes quite impossible when
there is constant alteration of the inner self. Personality must be highly
stable over time. As a matter of rank empiricism, I have always been
impressed by how people's changes in attitudes, behavior, and personality are both gradual and predictable even over long stretches of time. It
is usually quite easy to pick up the threads of a conversation with someone whom I have not seen for a decade or more. We need not fear that
any radical instability defeats the individual's ability to plan for his own
future.
This observation notwithstanding, individual preferences for work
and consumption do evolve over time. Any person who has seen other
persons at different stages of their lives knows that some demands change
as people age. Yet, as long as the ordinary person is aware of the problem, he will probably want to invest his assets in ways that permit some
flexibility in future use-at least with respect to those matters for which
preferences are expected to change. Most people keep their pension
funds in liquid and tradeable assets for good reasons. Although we know
today that consumption at certain levels may be required in the future, a
person can defer some consumption decisions until after obtaining better
information, as by consulting with people who have already reached retirement age. A person need not choose a retirement home at age 35,
even if he sets aside retirement income at that time. There is certainly a
mortality risk, but millions of people take advantage of simple lifetime
annuities that allow them to keep a constant (or other desired) level of
income over their lives. A great deal of difference exists between philo15. See generally Heiner, The Origin of PredictableBehavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560 (1983),
cartied over to law in Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent
and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986).
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sophical doubt about personal identity and imperfect information about
future demands. The former, like assumptions of immortality, makes it
impossible to think about routine transactions in a sensible way. The
latter is an argument for private ordering. People probably have better
knowledge of their own future than do others, even if both are mistaken.
Insurance companies always worry about selection against the firm precisely for this reason: their customers know more about the true status of
risk than they will reveal to an insurance carrier. But individuals have
less incentive to conceal the truth from themselves. Where knowledge is
imperfect, the costs of external regulation quickly outstrip the costs of
self-regulation.
II.

The Family and the Future

Thus far, I have confined the discussion to cases of intertemporal
decisions in the life of a single person. What happens when the future
belongs to different people in a different generation? Here I begin with
one assertion about human nature that I hope is not too controversial.
Individuals do not seek to maximize individual utilities, but instead have
16
utility functions that are heavily interdependent with their offspring.
The most powerful source of this interdependence is not disinterested
benevolence, although surely that is an important force. It is genetic
connection, which induces parents to take into account the utility of their
children (and the reverse as well) in making their decisions about present
and future consumption.
The genetic code thus creates a bias that works against ignoring the
future. The wise sooial system will exploit what nature has provided in
an effort to span the generations. The trick is to make connections across
the generations that exploit this bias toward the future. A simple example that can be constructed from the practice of making trusts illustrates
how this can be done.
Assume that there are two sets of parents, each with two children.
Each set of parents has accumulated a sufficient level of wealth to believe
that the deferment of consumption from the present generation (in which
there is plenty) to the future generation (in which there may not be) is
desirable. The risk of a reversal of fortunes in the present generation also
exists, so that the extra wealth must serve double duty: Both as insurance for the parents and as an inheritance for the children.
16. See generally Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behaviour: 1, 7 J. THEORETICAL
BIOLOGY 1, 1 (1964) (explaining that under the natural selection theory, a species that demonstrates
parental care may maximize the number of offspring that reach adulthood, thus preferentially propagating the "parental care" gene).
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Standard legal practices can cope with the problem. One such practice is to place the property in trust, under terms that specify that the
income is to go to the surviving parent, usually the mother, for life, with
the remainder-the principal of the trust-to her children. Given the
possible changes in the mother's position, she receives under the trust the
right to invade the corpus to maintain her existing standard of living.
She alone has complete discretion to decide whether a distribution from
the corpus should be make and her decision is not reviewable (so the
trust instrument states) by any court.
Arrangements of this sort tend to be perfectly stable in practice, so
that the consumption patterns typically follow the lines stated in the
trust instrument. Parents who invade the corpus think long and hard
about their decision, and the common pattern is (if anything) to cut
down consumption short of emergencies, such as major medical bills, to
see that the inheritance passes to the next generation intact, especially if
the children face financial burdens that the parents have been lucky
enough to escape. The practice continues again over time, generally in
regular form. Deviations occur, of course, but the infrequency of litigation, or indeed of disagreement, between different generations under a
trust is powerful evidence of the power of interdependent utility functions to bind families together over time. The bequest motive thus tends
to defer consumption and to promote investment.
This point becomes more vivid if we contrast the standard trust with
an alternative arrangement having identical formal properties but very
different economic ones. Switch the trusts around a bit: Take Mrs. A
and make the remaindermen under her trust the children of Mr. B. Then
do the same thing under the second trust. To see that there is no sleight
of hand here, assume further that both trusts have identical assets, that
both A and B have the same life expectancy, and that the position of both
sets of children are identical in all respects. Under these two "cross"
trusts, Mrs. A has the power to invade the corpus of a trust in which the
remaindermen are the children of Mr. B, and vice versa.
There is no observational experience that tells us how a parent
behaves when the remaindermen behind the trust are someone else's children. The reason is perfectly clear. No one in his right mind would
create cross trusts in this fashion, because the business risks are too
great.17 The obvious interdependence of utilities between the present and
17. Here the case law may prove helpful. There are a number of cases that address the estate
taxation of cross trusts. In their simplest form, A creates a trust for B to life, remainder to B's
children, while B creates a trust of equal value to A with like remainder to B. The ostensible objective of the trust is to remove the remainder interest to A and B's children for the taxable estate of A
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the future generation disappears. Each set of parents has the same incentives: To strip his or her respective trust of all its assets, and to place
those assets in a second conventional trust, in which A has her children
as remaindermen, and so too with B. There is something akin to a prisoner's dilemma,1 8 given that A and B cannot bind themselves to each
other by contract. Each will say: "If I am honest, I will surely lose out,
because A (or B) will not be; or if A (or B) is honest, then I can do far
better by cheating on the trust in which I am the tenant for life." Why
play a game that you cannot win? The best scenario is that each parent
will invade the corpus and set up a conventional family trust for the benefit of both generations. Incurring the transaction costs of this scenario
makes no sense because they cannot generate any gains. Trusts, therefore, remain family institutions.
Suppose we change the rules of the game. One possibility is that the
law prevent the parents from reinvesting the assets of this novel trust in a
conventional trust, with remainders to his or her children. Now their
choices would be somewhat different, but it still does not follow that the
power to invade the corpus will be exercised in a disinterested fashion.
Each parent would measure the gain from personal consumption against
the satisfaction that they derive by seeing a stranger take what they have
left over. Even if there is some altruism, it operates at far lower levels
than does concern for one's own children. We should expect to see,
therefore, the invasion of the corpus well nigh complete, with, at most,
scraps left over. The moral should be clear: When the freedom of the
present generation to make unfettered dispositions is crimped, we have to
worry, at the very least, about the alterations in their consumption patterns in ways that reduce the total stock of wealth available in the future.
The private law of inheritance and trust exhibits just this concern. When
the law provides that certain monies must pass to particular persons, the
recipients are the decedent's children, not strangers.' 9 In some cases,
and B respectively. The problem arises because ifA created a trust for himself for life, remainder to
his children, the full value of the corpus would be taxed under section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, because the grantor retained a life estate. The ruse has been repeatedly struck down as a
carefully crafted evasion of a (dubious) estate tax provision. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of
Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 321 (1969); Estate of Moreno v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir.
1958); Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1940). For our purposes, the relevant
point is that at no time did any of the cross trusts take the form of a grantor, A, creating a life estate
in B with remainder in his own children, even though that disposition would have been unassailable
under section 2036(a). The personal risks are too great.
18. See generally R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-3 (1982) (explaining the concept of the
prisoner's dilemma).
19. See, e.g., W. McGOVERN, S. KURTZ & J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 7, 96-97
(1988) (explaining general rules of family members who inherit property of an intestate ancestor, and
common-law limitations on a testator's right to disinherit members of his immediate family); UNIF.
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there will be conflict between what parents want to do and what they
have to do, but these cases will be relatively infrequent. A far greater
conflict arises when dispositions must be made for the benefit of strangers. Such a disposition will predictably produce greater consumption in
the first generation, with fewer assets to pass on to the next generation.
The effort to create redistribution of wealth within the second generation
reduces the amount of wealth passed on to that generation. We cannot
have it both ways.
Bruce Ackerman has suggested one way around this problem: the
creation of a tripartite bargain between the member of the present generation with the wealth (Manic Senior), his own offspring (Manic Junior),
and some other offspring (Depressive Junior). 20 In his view, the baseline
position allows Manic Senior to consume all of his excess wealth-that
above and beyond his original allocation-but he can leave extra
amounts to his own offspring only if he procures the "waiver" from other
persons in that generation. 2 1 He effectively sets up a bargaining game
with an extensive range of outcomes that improves on the original position he postulates. Thus, if Manic Senior has four units of surplus, he
can consume it all, and no one can object. But he cannot leave it to his
son. Father and son, however, can buy off the outsider with any portion
of the gain. It is hard to know what the exact bargaining range is. If
Manic Senior knows about the problem in advance, he can arrange his
affairs to increase the consumption value of his assets, and hence improve
his own threat position. Assuming that he can raise his consumption up
to two and that the payments to the outsider are between zero and two,
bargaining pressures will dissipate part of that surplus, and less wealth
will pass to the next generation than under a system that tolerates all
forms of inequality across generations.
Thus far this simple model has contrasted two extreme cases: those
in which the parents give all to their children and those in which they
gave all to strangers. In practice the law may adopt a mixed strategy in
which part goes to the children and part to strangers. An estate tax represents just such a practice. The higher the rate of tax, the greater the
fraction of the wealth that goes, via the public treasury, for the benefit of
(but not into the hands of) strangers. At this point, we should expect the
parents to adopt a mixed strategy of their own in reply. They will compare the utilities of full consumption for themselves against the indirect
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, -103 (West 1982) (providing that under intestate succession rules, prop-

erty passes to the spouse, issue, and other relatives of the decedent).
20. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 204-06.
21. See id. at 204-07.
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benefits they get from the fractional consumption of their children, taking into account any marginal benefits that those children receive from
their negligible interest in the common fund. One expects that the transfers will still be relatively substantial in practice, if only because consumption patterns become less variable as people become older, when
many people desire to hold on to wealth in the face of, for example, fears
of major medical expenses. The estate tax has not destroyed all transfer
of wealth to the next generation, but it has surely inhibited it.
The effects of the tax are more substantial in light of its effect on
conduct before death. Transmission between the generations does not
begin at death. It typically begins with prenatal care and continues with
education and upbringing during youth and, most importantly, with educational expenditures long past the point at which children reach their
majority. As people today routinely live into their seventies and eighties,
transmission at death often takes place only when their children are well
into middle age and their grandchildren are into their adult years. (One
objectionable feature of the estate tax is that it ties taxation to mortality,
so that its incidence and severity depends on the good or bad fortune that
determines length of life. 22) Many important intergenerational transfers
will therefore take place during life in forms that no system of transfer
taxation can easily reach. Paying for education and the housing of minor
children is only one obvious example. Others may assume great importance as well. Parents can take children in as business partners on
favorable terms, with on-the-job instruction. They can provide their children with valuable advice or financial backing if the children wish to
strike out on their own. 23 They can make valuable gifts of service, such
24
as managing stock portfolios that they have given to their offspring.
It is of course possible to try to counteract the partiality that parents
show toward their children during life, but now the steps are far more
intrusive than any straightforward tax imposed on transfers at death. Inter vivos transfers are much harder to reach because consumption by
parents is necessarily closely entwined with consumption by children. A
22. There is, for example, an enormous difference in the estate tax burden between the person
who dies at 60 and the one who dies at 90. The latter person not only defers payment of the tax by
30 years, but also has the opportunity to make large annual inter vivos transfers in order to reduce
the size of the estate still further. Without making any exact calculations, dying at age 90, apart
from its other benefits, probably reduces the effective estate tax burden by well over 90 percent. An
income tax is not subject to the same vagaries of fortune.
23. See, e.g., J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 7-22 (1984)
(discussing the fine distinction between earned wealth and inheriter wealth particularly in the context of wealthy parents employing their children).
24. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1947) (holding that the grantor's
management of a trust portfolio did not represent a taxable gift from the grantor to the trust).
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simple gift tax on out and out transfers of money or property will not
suffice; more radical intervention is needed in order to combat the disguised transfer of money, services, and support that routinely takes place
within families. The law might force children out of the home or impose
a special tax on families who educate their own children so as to provide
scholarship funds in equal amounts for the needy. Because of the coercive nature of the egalitarian enterprise, we should expect powerful political resistance to this form of public intervention. Even as the ethic of
redistribution continues to make major political inroads into the traditional institutions of private property, the tax reforms of the 1980s have
virtually abolished the entire transfer tax system for all but the very rich,
most of whom can evade huge portions of it by a combination of shrewd
tax planning, which takes advantage of the ten-thousand-dollar annual
25
exclusion per donor/donee, and solid longevity.
The effort to secure a patrimony for the next generation also has its
powerful effects on production. The tax across generations works like
any other redistributive tax. The tax reduces the private return on investment, which in turn leads to a reduction in investment level, an increase in present consumption, and an increase in disguised or tax-free
transfers. Again the lesson seems clear. Transfer taxes may secure redistribution within the second generation, but they cannot secure transfers
to the second generation.
III.

Public Investment and the Future

Another strategy that might be adopted to cope with the conflicts
between generations, given the limitations of an estate tax, is to impose a
system of income taxation coupled with public investment in projects,
that have expected lives running over to the next generation. But again,
there is strong reason to doubt that such a system will work.
Let us start with the simplest model-one that ignores all political
complications associated with running collective investments. The critical question is how private individuals will respond to the changes in the
level of the state's collective investment. The best assumption is that private individuals will treat their own total wealth as the sum of their private wealth and the subjective valuation that they attach to the resources
held in government hands. My personal wealth is not solely the sum of
my land, cash, personal effects, and the like. To that figure one must add
the subjective value that I attach to my interest in highway infrastruc25. The changes are reflected in legal education where the course on estate and gift transaction,
once a staple of the upper years, is no longer taught at many law schools, and when the course is
taught, it is taken by relatively few students.
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ture, good (or bad) government, defense, and the like. The states as such
does not own those assets. As is the case with the corporation, an aggregate theory of ownership reflects the underlying economic realities. Each
person takes into account on a pass-through basis the "fractional" public
burdens and liabilities as though they were his own. This point is especially important with such public benefits as social security, which is an
elaborate network of rights and liabilities across citizens and across
generations.
The difference between public and private wealth, however, indicates the obvious shortfall of this strategy. Levels of private savings can
be reduced to offset the increase in public savings and investment. As a
first approximation, therefore, the total level of future investment is not
likely to increase by adopting this strategy, given the available private
responses. Such is the result of the so-called Ricardo Equivalence Theorem, proved anew by Robert Barro26 under the usual restrictive assumptions that all individuals have identical tastes and wealth, that all have
equally strong bequest motives, that population will remain constant
over time, and that technology will not change. Even if these assumptions are relaxed in some degree, Barro's basic point seems to be correct.
Private investment decreases somewhat to offset the increased investment by the state.
What happens when these austere assumptions are relaxed? Suppose we assume that some individuals have bequest motives and that
others do not, that population and technology can change, and, most
importantly, that it becomes costly to monitor persons who have direct
responsibility for the choice of investments made both on the public and
private side of the line. Public and private investments are still substitutes for each other, and neither will be as efficient as each would be in a
world in which it is possible to abstract from individual differences, political pressures, and institutional frameworks. When we take these complications into account, the question concerns the relative rate of decline
in the efficiency of both public and private investment, from some ideal
level obtainable only by an omniscient and benevolent being. Unfortunately, the differences suggest that public expenditures will be less
favorable to the next generation than will private ones. The simplest illustration is the general disrepair in which we often find public bridges,
26. See Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1095 (1974). The gist of
Barro's argument is that where there is forced deferred consumption on the public side, self-interested individuals will increase their consumption of private assets to offset those losses. Under very
restrictive assumptions, the offsets can be made well nigh precise. Id. at 1098.
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highways, and buildings, especially in comparison with capital assets in
private hands.
The differences are not random but systematic. The root of the
problem has to do with the connection between ownership (and liability)
structures and the ability to create and preserve value over the long run.
The easiest way to illustrate the problem is by comparing the ordinary
business corporation whose shares are publicly traded and governmental
management of property, which ordinarily takes the form of a public
trust in which the individual citizen's interests cannot be alienated in any
organized market. (Even citizens who leave the country cannot sell their
fractional interests of public assets to new immigrants but are forced to
abandon them.).
The genius of the corporate form of business has often been elaborated 27 and need be discussed only briefly here. Complex business arrangements require large accumulations of capital, which will not be
made when each individual is an ordinary partner of the everyday partnership. Partners normally have the power to bind each other for transactions in connection with the business, 28 and no one will place his entire
wealth on the line if a total stranger with whom he is in partial association can make contracts or commit torts creating obligations far exceeding the possible return on the investment. Limited liability centralizes
the management of the firm and creates shares that are both fungible and
freely transferable, and hence marketable at a readily determined, uniform price. 29 Once the shares are sold, the seller retains no contingent
liability for the conduct of the firm. Notice of the corporate status protects prospective trading partners, and tort creditors can be protected by
minimum capitalization or insurance requirements. It is quite impossible
to conceive how modern business could be conducted without use of the
corporate form, which, when generally available and properly regulated,
generates sufficient wealth to offset the occasional injustice that arises
when corporate assets are insufficient to meet the claims of tort creditors-a risk that is, caterusparibus, far greater for small companies than
for large ones.
For these purposes, however, it is important to note the impact of
marketable shares on the incentives of firm managers. These shares ordinarily trade at a price estimated as the discounted present value of the
27. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESS ENTERPRISES 128-32 (1983) (discussing advantages of availability of credit, limited liability of
shareholders, and continuity of existence in the corporate form).
28. See id. at 70-71.
29. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89,
94-98 (1985).
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future income stream associated with the corporate assets. A short-term
accounting profit, which is achieved only by invading the corpus, does
not induce the market to capitalize that inflated figure to determine the
value of the shares. Instead, the accounting entry is recognized for what
it is-a return of capital-so that the full valuation takes into account
both the lower level of real profit and the diminution in capital attributable to the invasion of the corpus. External monitoring of corporate assets
is not perfect, but financial experts usually can work wonders in piercing
through the fog of balance sheet notes. Firm managers, therefore, have
an insistent incentive to maximize the full lifetime income stream of corporate assets, for a sharp reduction in price could expose them to derivative suits, displacement by shareholder vote or hostile takeover bid. The
ability to buy and sell shares today in "the market for corporate control"
disciplines the managers to preserve the corporate corpus for tomorrow.
Citizens qua citizens do not hold marketable shares in publicly
owned assets. I cannot take my fractional interest in United States military preparedness or in national parks and sell it to an outsider, whether
I wish to abjure the benefits of a particular project or to leave the country. The absence of a ready market in shares reduces first the ability, and
hence the incentive, of citizens to value publicly held assets and to monitor the progress of government managers. When there is an invasion of
the corpus-say the sale of timber, water or grazing rights at below market values-no private citizen can make a substantial gain by detecting
the breach and calling present management to account. Publicly owned
property has little in common with assets owned by publicly listed but
privately owned corporations.
In some sense, the fitter comparison is with the private or closed
corporation, in which shares are inalienable, either because of restrictions
contained within the charter or because of the reluctance of outsiders to
buy into family firms. Nonetheless, family corporations are characterized by a common interest-again, interdependent utilities-that helps to
keep manager's in line, and typically many shareholders also have management positions within the firm that help them to monitor its activities. 30 Even so, matters often get very sticky, and the changes between
the generations are often best handled by some mandatory "buy-sell"
arrangement funded by life insurance on key shareholders.
Ordinary citizens, however, possess none of the advantages that
compensate shareholders of closed corporations for the inalienability of
their interests. Ordinary citizens have tiny fractional interests in the
30. See. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 693-783.
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whole, and they find it difficult to coordinate their activities to monitor
public officials. These officials, in turn, have powerful incentives to use
or dispose of public assets for private gain, and they are subject to pressure by interest groups who wish to get more than their fair share of the
public asset for less than their fair share of the price. Public highways,
for example, must be maintained, yet taxes ordinarily do a poor job of
matching the costs that different classes of users impose. General revenues may be used for projects that give disproportionate benefits to some
concentrated group of individuals. Similarly, other fee structures are
often ill-suited to induce the proper use of publicly held assets. If trucks
weigh ten times as much as cars, their concentrated weight means that
one truck-mile causes far more damage to the roads than ten car-miles.
A formally neutral formula that makes user fees a linear function of car
weight necessarily contains an implicit subsidy of trucks by cars, from
which the usual economic distortions result. 31 The result will be too
great a use of trucks and not enough use of cars or other forms of transportation. A gasoline tax may well produce similar distortions if the car
gets thirty miles per gallon and the heavy truck gets three. What is true
of taxes is also true of regulation. The restriction of access to public
roads through the creation of gratuitous monopolies in truck transporta32
tion is one of the sad tales of twentieth century regulatory policy.
These errors create more than distortions within a given generation;
they also create distortions between generations. Public officials and private interest groups have a built-in preference for present over future
gains. In particular, office holders run for reelection and have much to
gain if their cash account appears to be high, even though their capital
account is low. Their political incentives are to let deferred maintenance
accumulate, for its costs come home to roost only after they leave office.
33
Hence the problem with bridges and roads.
The protection of future generations is very hard even when the
31. Thus ifa car causes $1.00 of damage for 100 miles, then the truck should pay a tax 20 times
as great as a car in order to avoid the implicit transfer from cars to trucks. A regime that taxes
trucks only 10 times the rate of cars imposes an implicit tax on cars and provides an implicit subsidy
for trucks. The consequences will be the usual: too many trucks and too few cars will ride the road.
And general revenues may be needed to cover any shortfall when the vehicle taxes do not cover
maintenance costs.
32. The development can be traced in some key cases. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Binford, 287
U.S. 251, 278 (1932) (upholding a Texas statute requiring contract carriers to obtain permits to
operate on state highways); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 599
(1926) (holding a California statute subjecting private carriers to the burdens of common carriers to
be unconstitutional). See also Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Forward Unconstitutional
Conditions,State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47-54 (1988) (discussing
the implications of Frost Trucking).
33. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1988, at B3, col. 1.
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political system, say, through the pressure of environmental groups,
works to preserve long-term assets in their original form. The difficulty
here is that one cannot determine the wealth of the next generation simply by counting the number of acres of virgin timber that have been
purchased for national parks. The cutting of timber does not necessarily
amount to a transfer from the future generation to the present generation; the uses to which that timber is put must also be taken into account.
If the timber in question is used to build long-term assets, such as housing, it may well be that long-term values are diminished by nationalization as inefficient public uses are substituted for more efficient, private
ones. Again, standing timber is often a wasting asset, so that the failure
to harvest in a proper mode results in older trees with rotten wood
crowding out the newer growths that might replace them. 34 The ability
to make sense of the individual worth of the collective account makes it
hard to determine the soundness of strategies endorsed even by persons
whose concern for the future generation is unquestionable. Matters do
not improve when a laudable public motive is absent. The timber company with a license to cut timber from public lands will care less about
the damage to the land and the environment than one that owns the land
on which the timber stands. In the former case, the loss is externalized
on the public at large; in the latter, it is not. Public officials are generally
not as good businessmen as private entrepreneurs, if only because they do
not face the right incentives for either loss or gain. The Forest Service's
ability to monitor and control abuses of their lessees is likely to be less
than their private counterparts. Their errors can have adverse effects on
the maintenance of assets held in public trust. Once institutional imperfections are taken into account, therefore, the public ownership of assets
poses great risk to the ability to preserve resources for the long haul.
IV.

Deficits

The problem that exists on the asset side of the ledger can exist as
well on the liability side. It is quite striking that the ever increasing size
of the public deficit emerges in an age when the fraction of GNP devoted
to governmental spending, or subject to governmental regulation, is at an
all-time high. Deficits are charges that must be paid off in the future,
often by the next generation. The analysis here, however, is again quite
tricky, because it is impossible to determine the full social significance of
the deficit by simply recording its amount. Other factors again have to
34. For a chronicle of difficulties with public management of forests, see FORESTLANDS: PUBLIC & PRIVATE (R. Deacon & M. Johnson eds. 1985).
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be taken into account. Two bear special mention: the uses to which the
35
borrowed capital are put and the soundness of the debt structure.
First, it is necessary to have some sense of the expected life of the
assets that are purchased with the borrowed funds. If these assets had an
expected life equal to the length of the debt, and if the debt itself were
paid off by revenues generated solely from the asset, there would be no
intergenerational transfer from the future to the present. Ideally, in each
period the value of the public asset would exceed the amount of liabilities
allocable to its depreciation and maintenance, so that people in each time
period are net winners in the amount of period benefits over period costs.
A system of revenue bonds, for example, in which the debts incurred to
build a highway were funded only by the tolls the road generated would
offer an example of a sound public project, even if the highway disappeared the moment the debt was discharged. Because the general credit
of the State is not on the line, the individual creditors to the project now
have an incentive to monitor both its revenue and costs: their own financial return is jeopardized by any shortfall. For the project to go forward,
therefore, it must have a positive expected value.
This regime of asset-based financing, however, is not perfect because
the highway system could well generate external benefits beyond those
captured by highway users. The road may be critical for defense in times
of national emergency. Yet even here the sound rule is to guess the size
of that external benefit, and to fund it out of the defense appropriation
and not from general highway funds. Now the defense establishment is
forced to trade its use of the road system against other direct military
purchases. The residue should be funded from revenues generated to
minimize the political pressures that might point to excessive construction. Building the wrong long-term assets does not promote the welfare
of the next generation.
Unfortunately, many public projects are not funded in this fashion.
If there is a long-term debt for an asset with a short expected life, then
some portion of the cost is externalized on the next generation in ways
that cut against the goal of intergenerational justice. More to the point,
public indebtedness today is not only incurred for long-term capital
projects. Huge amounts of the deficit are incurred to generate short-term
transfers to the present generation. It is no great news that the most
powerful coalition in Washington today is the elderly and that social security benefits, including medical services, have increased ,far more rap35. See R. EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT? 3-8 (1986) (suggesting that there is
an optimum level of deficit spending and that a deficit can be either too low or too high).
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idly than has the cost of living (and more than any other component of
the welfare budget). These transfers systematically thwart any claims of
36
intergenerational justice. Barro's model of intergenerational transfers
suggests that these shortfalls will be offset by private transfers from parents to their children. But the frictional costs he excludes from his model
are too great to ignore. Some elderly do not have children, and others
will choose to consume some portion of their investment, given their own
pressing needs. The parents of many working-age people have already
died, cutting off the possibility of compensating private transfers. The
level of future tax and benefit increases remains uncertain, and the political costs of deciding who gets how much further undermine the effectiveness of the private response to social security. People can mitigate
the costs of regulation, but mitigation never brings us back to where we
would have been had the first misstep not been taken. An alternative
system that granted a tax deduction for money put into private retirement plans could (like any other consumption tax) remove the additional
taxation burdens imposed upon private savings, without creating the uncertainty over both contribution and benefit levels. Even if participation
in this program were made mandatory, the implicit backward redistribution of the present social security system would be reduced. But as matters stand, the political pressures favor those who vote, especially in a
regime that offers but negligible protection to private property.
My second concern with public debt is directed to the form in which
this obligation is held. Consider two debt structures. Case One is a debt
structure in which each of ten people owe a single creditor ten dollars,
for a total indebtedness of one hundred dollars. Case Two is a debt
structure where ten people are jointly and severally liable for one hundred dollars to a stranger, without rights of contribution and indemnity
among themselves. In a world in which all parties are perfectly solvent
and thoroughly reputable, the two debt structures have the same eco37
nomic effects: the austere assumptions of Barro's model are satisfied.
The creditor's asset is worth one hundred dollars and each debtor is liable for ten dollars. The moment, however, one recognizes the human
tendency to avoid paying money, the two structures are no longer the
same. When the debt is joint, each party has incentives to make the
36. See Barro, supra note 26, at 1105-07 (showing that public transfers in one direction are
offset by private transfers in the opposite direction, regardless of the direction of the public transfer
or the number of geherations it spans); see also Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 3. POL.
EcON. 1063, 1077 (1974) (positing that given present and future generations fully connected by
intergenerational "bequests," public transfers of wealth from one generation to another will be offset
by bequests in the opposite direction).
37. See Barro, supra note 26, at 1098-101.
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others pay his share of the debt. In ordinary private markets, this problem is effectively (although not perfectly) counteracted by a general rule
that allows any codebtor who pays more than his pro rata share to have
indemnity and contribution against his fellow debtors. That debt structure gives the creditor the security of knowing that a single suit can satisfy the full claim, while leaving the hapless debtor who has paid more
than his proportionate share full recourse against those who have not.
That system of contribution and indemnity is not, however, available in the public sphere. Now there is a built-in tendency to introduce
methods for repayment that reduce the proponents' own fraction of the
payment. One way to discharge the debt is through a progressive income
tax. The shares of the indebtedness implicitly shift, as the poor pay less
and the rich pay more. Alternatively, where the debt is refinanced by
new borrowing the obligation remains constant across different classes of
individuals. The total amount of indebtedness is not reduced by shifting
between these payment methods, but the costs of trying to shift the incidence of debt, whether successful or not, result in some long-term social
loss. An elimination of the progressive tax thus offers an important advantage: the choice between debt and tax financing will depend less on
distributional consequences, thereby reducing the opportunities for strategic behavior and placing some gentle constraint against increasing the
total amount of government expenditures. Indefinite property rights
tend to reduce the value of the assets so owned. The analogue to this
debt case is the proposition that ten owners with a one-tenth interest in
ten houses behave differently from ten owners, each with his own house.
In exactly the same fashion, indefinite obligations generally increase the
total economic cost of the underlying debt. The problem of rent-seeking
that takes place with the acquisition of assets can also arise with the
38
avoidance of liabilities.
Inflation presents yet another risk to long-term contracting. Since
the government (at least the federal government) controls the printing
presses, the temptation to discharge the public debt by increasing the
money supply and inflating the currency is great. This stratagem reduces
the real amount of fixed debt and effects a short-term implicit transfer
from creditors to debtors. Arguably the strategy is self-defeating, because the public debt is "internal" in that we owe the money to ourselves,
so that what we gain in one capacity we lose in the other.
38. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 184 (J. Buchanan, R.
Tollison & G. Tullock eds. 1980). For an argument on the limitation of the anticipated level of rentdissipation, see Flowers, Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation: A Critical View, 7 CATO J. 431, 439

(1987).
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Yet the fallacy of composition works in this area as well. 39 The argument about internal debt is correct only if every person has the identical interest as creditor (such as that of a lender of private money to the
state) as he does as debtor (such as that of a citizen). But debt instruments are never held in precise proportion to wealth by all citizens.
Some people are not creditors at all; some have extensive amounts of
government paper. Much credit is held by foreign creditors, who are
especially vulnerable to domestic manipulations of the money supply.
Political coalitions do have incentives to change the value of money in
order to alter the size of the debt. The creditor's gains are offset by the
debtor's losses, but (as ever) the transaction is not an economic wash,
because someone has to bear the costs of influencing the political process,
while everyone has to bear the increased costs of uncertainty in the value
of government bonds. 40
To complete the picture, inflation also imposes risks on any longterm private indebtedness, for if private debtors can increase the rate of
inflation, they can secure an implicit wealth transfer from their creditors.
(The converse is true of deflation.) Any reduction in the stability of longterm money markets necessarily increases the costs of borrowing in all
markets and tends to invite huge amounts of regulation-such as mortgage moratoria statutes and anti-deficiency legislation-which further
impede the operation of private credit markets. 4 1 There will be less longterm investment. Yet variation in inflation rates can be reduced most
39. "We are committing the fallacy of composition when we argue from the premise that every
man can decide how he will act to the conclusion that the human race can decide how it will act
......

R. HARDIN, supra note 18, at 1 (quoting Mackie, Fallacies,3 ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 169, 173

(P. Edwards ed. 1967)). The fallacy aliplies to any movement from the single individual to any
group, however small the group.
40. Uncertain levels of inflation convert any fixed income offering into a variable payment
instrument whose maximum value (when inflation is always zero) is achieved when inflation remains
at zero. The costs are that uncertainty simultaneously reduces the return to creditors and increases
the costs to borrowers. The sum of those two costs acts as a wedge that prevents gainful transactions
from taking place where the difference between what the debtor demands and what the creditor is
willing to pay is smaller than the total level of uncertainty.
41. A mortgage moratoria statute defers the creditor's right to foreclose on the underlying
security in exchange for giving the creditor some additional rights of interest. This prolonged extension of the debt usually leaves the creditor with a bundle of rights that are worth less than those
enjoyed before regulation, but the courts have been reluctant to disprove of all such statutes categorically. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-45 (1934) (sustaining a
state mortgage moratoria statute and defining broadly the inherent government rights under police
power); see also Epstein, Toward a Revitalization ofthe ContractClause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703, 735
(1984).
An antideficiency statute denies the creditor the right to sue the debtor for more than the
amount of the property given to secure the loan. To the extent that the value of property has dipped
below the face level of a loan, the statute denies the creditor his remedy for the difference via a
"deficiency judgment." Substantial deflation in the economy, such as that experienced in the 1930s,
transfers enormous sums of wealth to creditors. These two types of statutes are highly imperfect and
are generally mischievous responses. A stable currency eliminates any case for either remedy.
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effectively if the discretion of public officials in setting monetary policy is
controlled. 42 Limited government again offers certain long-term advantages. A fixed rule, for example, that tied the expansion of the money
supply to the prior year's increase in the GNP would be a good thing.
Whether we deal with public assets or public liabilities, a small state with
limited discretion is the best way to promote the welfare of the next generation. The real risk in politics is that collective ownership will work
redistribution back toward the present, toward those who have the votes.
V.

Property Rights and the Future

I have said enough to show that there is no obvious reason to think
that any policy of redistributive taxes or social investment will in fact aid
the redistribution toward the next generation. The only remaining issue
is whether any policy is needed. The ordinary rules of property, contract, and tort, enforced by a limited government subject to stringent eminent domain restrictions, are far more likely to achieve that end, if only
because the protection of the future is the ordinary outgrowth of the consistent application of these rules.
Start with the ownership of labor. In the libertarian model, each
person owns his own labor and need not perform any special act to acquire it. It follows, therefore, that all newborns have a substantial set of
endowments that they do not take in any way from the generation that
precedes them. Some members of that generation will have greater endowments than others, but if the concern is with intergenerational equities, then any inequalities within a given age cohort can be safely ignored.
The problem of unsound endowments can be handled by ordinary charitable contributions or welfare programs, as these are administered at any
given time, wholly without regard to the age of the payors or recipients.
Next there are physical assets. Land necessarily is permanent, and
the improvements on it generally have an expected life beyond its present
owner. These assets will be passed on, unless we think that persons in
the present take great pleasure in the destruction of what they have created. This last risk seems quite small. Most people do make bequests to
their children, and where wealth is sufficient, to permanent institutions
such as universities, hospitals, and foundations. Regulatory intervention
at common law has never been concerned with people who want to de42. See generally Kydland & Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 477-80 (1977) (explaining that real-time, discretionary control is
not the best tool for economic decision making, because it reduces the opportunities for game playing by rational economic actors).
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stroy what they own; 43 rather it has been directed at restricting the period of time during which assets could be tied up in trust.44 Even if the
present generation wants heavy consumption, it has to sell permanent
assets to finance it. "You can't take it with you" is a very powerful
message, which indicates that much wealth stays behind-for the next
generation.
The situation is more striking when we move to intangible assets.
Some, like patents and copyrights, have value beyond the current
lifeholder and can be sold. It is difficult to know how these assets could
be destroyed, except by refusing to use, license, or sell a patent. Even
that strategy is self-defeating, because the government could then acquire
the intangible property for public use through eminent domain, at close
to zero cost-its value in the hands of its present owner. 45 In any event,
the prospect is not worth considering seriously given the tiny fraction of
assets for which destruction is plausible. The hard question with copyrights, trademarks, and patents concerns their ideal duration, which
could vary from property form to property form. The tradeoff is that
longer periods of protection induce greater invention, but only at the cost
of more limited use over time. The trick is to minimize the sum of the
two costs. If this is done in present value terms, future generations will
be well served by the regime of property rights so created.
There is, moreover, a huge body of intangibles properly regarded as
part of the public domain. Mathematicians who prove important theorems have their names immortalized. Pythagoras does not get exclusive
rights to use his own theorem. The stock of human knowledge generally
43. Cf.Pound, The Law of PropertyandRecent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 996 (1939)
(discussing six rights of property, includingjus abutendi,or the right of destroying or injuring one's
own property). One exception has been the question of whether executors are under a duty to destroy the private papers of the testators according to instructions. Note that if the requests are
routinely dishonored, then the papers can be destroyed prior to death. The eminent domain option
in the text also remains, as does the possibility of preserving the papers while limiting access to them.
For a discussion of Franz Kafka's order to his executor, Max Brod, see R. HAYMAN, KAFKA: A
BIOGRAPHY 286 (1982).

44. The two major rules are the rule against perpetuities and the rule against unreasonable
accumulations. The point of both rules is said to be the prevention of the "dead hand" from ruling
the future. Stated otherwise, these rules aim to mitigate the risk that the present generation will
attempt to protect grandchildren at the expense of children. There is no evidence that excessive
short-term consumption is an important problem with private wealth, even if many of the philosophical examples treat death bed consumption binges as one of the realistic alternatives of the dying.
See, eg., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 205 (presenting a hypothetical deathbed dialogue between a
dying devisor and a devisee who complains about unequal distribution of the devisor's wealth). My
view is that these rules are generally unnecessary, although largely harmless. See Epstein, Past and
Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 710 (1986).
45. See generally Kwall, Governmental Use of CopyrightedProperty: The Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 668, 726 (1989) (recognizing government's preeminent ability to exercise
eminent domain power over copyrighted property).
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increases, and the next generation always gets a free ride on the present,
just as the nondiscoverers in the present generation get a free ride on the
discoverers. It all works out pretty well. Academic positions, government honors, influence, and income may all be obtained by persons who
have contributed to knowledge, even if they cannot copyright or patent
their ideas as such.
The one major concern is the environment. But this is an area in
which it is critical to define systems of private rights for the present. The
common pool problem with fisheries is not solved by a rule allowing everyone the right to keep the fish that they catch. Some rule must be devised to preserve the long-term stock as well against, for example, oil
pollution. The common pool problem is writ large when the issue is the
preservation of diverse species, the prevention of the greenhouse effect,
or the restoration of the ozone layer. Some form of collective intervention is appropriate here, just as it is appropriate to prevent nuisances and
the premature exhaustion of common-pool assets. There are too many
potential plaintiffs and defendants for ordinary litigation to work, particularly for future generations. 4 6 But the same systems of regulation that
help in the present--damages, injunctions, tradeable permits-work to
our long-term advantage as well.
VI.

Conclusion

The proof in this case is generally in the pudding. To be born in the
future is to be born in a world that typically holds out the promise of
greater comfort and happiness. Historically, future generations have received benefits from past generations that exceed the level of transfers
stipulated under any of the standard theories of justice between the generations. We can keep it that way by observing the same principles of
private and public law that work to promote justice in the present generation. Indeed, we could probably do nothing today to neutralize the
power of the next generation if that generation decided to act in selfish
and short-sighted ways. If we govern ourselves well, we can and will
leave the blessings of liberty for our posterity. At that point, someone
else has to carry the ball.
46. A cogent recent example is the oil spill from the tanker Exxon Valdez in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, that occurred on March 24, 1989. See Largest U.S. Tanker Spews 270,000 Barrelsof
Oil off Alaska, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1; see also NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 24-34 (1989) (discussing the environ-

mental, energy, economic and health effects of the oil spill).
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